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Marcus Giaquinto at NYU on Knowing abstracta.
Preliminary considerations
Paolo Valore
A philosophical colloquium was held at the Department of Philosophy of the New
York University on October 7th 2011: Marcus Giaquinto (University College London,
Department of Philosophy) proposed the question: How can we know abstracta (prop-
erties, kinds, relations, roles, structures, and so on)? Giaquinto started recalling briefly
the marks of abstractness and remarked that the distinction abstract/concrete is prob-
ably vague and seems to come in grades (for instance, the symmetries of a rectangle:
horizontal and vertical, reflection and 180 ◦ rotation; the group of such symmetries under
composition; and the Klein Four group; here it seems that we are going up in level of ab-
stractness). But the main concern seems that abtracta are considered to be causally inert
and, if so, how can we have any knowledge of them?
The talk was divided into two parts: 1) Is there really a problem? and 2) Russell’s
view (focusing on knowledge by acquaintance).
1) The first answer that we can meet is: (a) No, this is not a genuine problem. This
is the case if there are not abstracta (cfr. Quine & Goodman, 1947). But this premise is
based on a “philosophical intuition” and it is not clear what a ”philosophical intuition”
is. Is it a strong ungrounded inclination to believe or what else? In any case, others have
the opposite philosophical intuition, so the problem cannot be dismissed easily.
There is also a moderate view, (b) according to which some putative kinds are real and
others are not. Gianquinto claimed that this should be our default view (rational inves-
tigations outside philosophy, for example in the history of science, distinguish between
alleged proprieties and kinds that are real and others that are not). But scientists’ claims
that such and such propriety, kind or condition is real are based on empirical evidence.
But this is not the main problem.
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According to Giaquinto, the serious argument is the following:
i) if our abstract singular terms really refer, we should know at least some of the
references but such things, but
ii) such things would be beyond causal contact and hence they would be unknowable,
so
iii) abstract singular terms have no real reference.
Another answer that we might meet is: (c) No, this is not a genuine problem because
we do have causal contact with proprieties and kinds. In favour of this view, one could
consider such expressions as “seeing the colour of the hair”. But Giaquinto remarked
that this use of the language does not imply that we really see the property: seeing the
colour of the lemon could mean seeing how it is coloured, not seeing the colour as a
kind. Finally, recalling the later Quine, Giaquinto considered the idea that we should
accept the posits of our best testable clusters of theory and auxiliary beliefs, even if they
are abstracta. But this is our commitment, not our knowledge. And similarly Putnam:
quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable, although this commits us to
accepting such entities. A turbo-charged version is: we know to be real the posits that
are requested by our best theories. But what is meant by ”best” here? More successful
or equally successful but superior in other respects (such as simplicity)? And in any case
this seems to be too lax: scientists seek relatively direct evidence for posits. We do not
accept the decision of which of the theories is considered the best. Resisting those dis-
missive or quick responses, Giaquinto then argued that this is a problem worth taking
seriously.
2) In the second part of the colloquium, Giaquinto considered Russell’s view in Rus-
sellwtf: it is obvious that we are acquainted with universals. According to the speaker,
Russell considers “acquainted with x” equivalent to “direct aware of x”. Basically, this
means that there is no intermediary. The contrast is with “knowledge by description”,
that is when the object to know is not directly known to us. But the problem here is that
we could be directly aware of something we do not know at all. So, does Russell here
use “knowing x” in a special sense? Gianquinto thinks that this is not the case and that
Russell denies that in chapter V, when, talking about the knowledge of the table, Russell
declares that we are acquainted with sense-data. Resisting the temptation to assign a spe-
cial, weak meaning to “knowing x” in this case, the speaker also considered very quickly
the possible distinction between “knowing x” and “knowing of x”, where it seems in-
volving knowledge by description. At any rate, Russell explicitly states that we have
direct awareness of
i) sense data;
ii) remembered experiences;
iii) our own feelings, thoughts and so on;
iv) one’s self;
v) universals.
Direct awareness occurs even it if takes time and involves complex processes, and
there is acquaintance even where there is abstraction.
Interlingvistikaj Kajeroj 3:1 (2012), 123–125. 124
After the presentation of Russell’s view, Giaquinto shared some final remarks and
comments, focusing on:
(a) knowledge by acquaintance as such: should we accept Russell’s account, given that
we do not accept his view of perception? And direct awareness does not seem to be, in
general, sufficient for knowing something. One suggestion here is that it might be not
the process but its source what is to be considered in this case. And, finally, does the
requirement that the source of knowing x is one’s own experience of x rule out knowing
a sensory quality by acquaintance? The answer depends on whether “experience of x”
includes both perceiving x and perceiving instances of x. And it is also to be considered
the stipulation of narrow and broad uses of knowledge by acquaintance;
(b) abstraction: Russell does not say what it is. Is it the formation of categories studied
by the scientist? Or is this just a kind of abstraction? There may be cognitively distinct
kinds of processes by which abstraction of this kind is achieved. And abstraction of this
kind is not enough to know a sensory quality. The acquisition of a category gives us the
capability to discriminate instances and non-instances, but in order to know a category
we also have to be able to: recognize an instance as an instance, search for an instance,
produce a sensory image for an instance. But what more beyond abstraction of this kind
(just “having” the category) is needed for knowing a sensory quality? And what other
kinds of abstraction are there? And, for each kind of abstract entity, what does it mean,
to know an entity of that kind, and how do we get to know
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